Trump’s Second-Term Foreign Policy Reorientation
In early 2025, President Donald Trump’s return to office marked a decisive shift in U.S. foreign policy. Under the influence of Elbridge Colby, Trump’s likely Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and author of The Strategy of Denial, Washington adopted a transactional, realist approach that deprioritised counterinsurgency in favour of great-power rivalry. This reorientation was symbolised by the omission of Afghanistan from the 2025 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community—the first time in two decades the country was excluded.
Yet, despite this bureaucratic disappearance, Afghanistan remains strategically significant in U.S. calculus—not as a theatre of war, but as a zone for limited, interest-based engagement.
Afghanistan Dropped from U.S. Threat Matrix: Symbolism or Strategy?
The exclusion of Afghanistan from the threat assessment is more than cosmetic. Historically labelled a hub of terrorism and instability, Afghanistan now finds itself eclipsed by the rising threats of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. This change aligns precisely with Colby’s strategic thesis: Afghanistan, once central to U.S. foreign policy, is now viewed as marginal unless its actions directly impact Indo-Pacific stability. Colby’s Senate confirmation hearing in March 2025 reinforced this doctrine, emphasising military resource allocation to theatres with direct implications for global power balances. Under this lens, the U.S. is no longer committed to reshaping Afghanistan. Rather, the focus lies on containment and conditional interaction.
Detainee Diplomacy and Transactional Engagement
On 20 March 2025, the Taliban released U.S. citizen George Glezmann after quiet negotiations led by Zalmay Khalilzad and Adam Boehler—marking the first such engagement on Afghan soil since the 2021 withdrawal. CNN’s Alex Marquardt reported that the Taliban delayed the release of Faye Dai Hall so Trump could claim credit, underlining the political calculation behind the move.
Shortly after, the U.S. delisted three Haqqani Network leaders, including Sirajuddin Haqqani, from its Rewards for Justice programme (Politico, 2025), although they remain sanctioned. One U.S. official noted: “Unconditional releases = great relations with Trump,” while another warned that non-compliance would result in “VERY big bounties—maybe even bigger than Bin Laden” (CNN, 2025). These developments reflect Colby’s doctrine of limited, high-leverage engagements aimed at extracting specific concessions without long-term commitments.
Economic Leverage: Tariffs and Trade as Foreign Policy Tools
On 2 April 2025, President Trump introduced a sweeping tariff plan targeting global competitors. While Afghanistan remains under U.S. sanctions and unrecognised diplomatically, it received a modest 10% tariff—despite imposing a 49% tariff on U.S. imports (Newsweek, 2025). This leniency carries strategic undertones. Rather than signalling recognition, it frames Afghanistan as a manageable actor in a transactional network, where limited economic incentives can yield diplomatic returns. This fits Colby’s vision of pragmatic burden-sharing: economic engagement is not about development but about securing U.S. interests with minimal investment.
Taliban Hardware Standoff: Sovereignty and Symbolic Defiance
On 29 March, Taliban spokesman Abdul Qahar Balkhi dismissed Trump’s call for the return of $7 billion in abandoned U.S. military hardware, stating, “It belongs to Afghanistan” (CBS News, 2025). This echoes Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada’s defiant 2022 declaration: “Even the atomic bomb won’t scare us” (Wikiquote, 2022). The Taliban continues to assert a hardline position on sovereignty and strategic assets, viewing these items as spoils of war and symbols of independence. For Washington, this reinforces the rationale behind limited engagement. The goal is not regime transformation but deterrence and containment through carefully calibrated pressure.
Akhundzada’s Isolationism: Limits of Strategic Alignment
Akhundzada remains the ideological centre of Taliban governance. On 27 March 2025, he reiterated his principle of non-interference: “Do not interfere in our internal affairs,” a sentiment he originally pronounced during the 2022 Great Gathering of Ulema. This insular worldview clashes with any form of strategic alignment. While the Trump administration may engage selectively, Akhundzada’s regime remains averse to deeper cooperation. For Colby, however, this suits the broader strategic blueprint: Afghanistan need not be an ally—only predictable and externally contained.
China, Iran, and the Regional Balancing Act
As the U.S. disengages, regional actors have increased their influence. China has invested heavily in Afghan mining and infrastructure since 2021, while Iran’s Chabahar Port now processes 30% of Afghan trade. The Herat–Khaf railway further anchors Tehran’s economic leverage (Reuters, 2023; Tehran Times, 2024). Despite diplomatic isolation from the West, the Taliban enjoy formal ties with both Beijing and Tehran. While this limits U.S. influence, Colby’s doctrine tolerates such alignments as long as they do not threaten broader geopolitical stability. Under this model, Afghanistan is not a prize to win, but a variable to monitor.
Key Takeaways
- Afghanistan was removed from the 2025 U.S. threat assessment, aligning with Elbridge Colby’s doctrine of strategic prioritisation.
- Detainee diplomacy underscores Trump’s preference for transactional, tactical foreign engagements.
- Economic tools, like low tariffs, are used to incentivise selective cooperation without formal recognition.
- The Taliban’s ideological stance, rooted in sovereignty and non-alignment, limits potential for deeper U.S. involvement.
- China and Iran have increased their footholds in Afghanistan, but the U.S. is prepared to tolerate this within a broader Indo-Pacific containment strategy.
Realpolitik in the Age of Disengagement
Trump’s 2025 Taliban policy reflects a redefined foreign policy ethos. Guided by Colby’s realist vision, it abandons expansive goals in favour of strategic minimalism. Afghanistan is no longer a focal point of U.S. foreign policy but a case study in calibrated disengagement. Washington no longer aims to democratise or dominate Kabul. Instead, it seeks to manage risk, extract tactical advantages, and ensure regional stability through economic pressure and deterrence. This may not produce transformative outcomes, but in a world governed by power balances rather than ideals, it may be sufficient. Whether Afghanistan adapts or resists is another question. For now, the U.S. has moved on. The Taliban, and their regional patrons, will need to decide if they can afford to do the same.