Rising Tensions and Afghanistan’s Strategic Exposure
Another Trump administration is back in town, and another war of words with Iran is in motion. On 3rd April 2025, the United States deployed stealth bombers to Diego Garcia and reinforced its presence in the Persian Gulf with two carrier strike groups. Though the immediate standoff is with Iran, neighbouring Afghanistan, now governed by the Taliban, occupies a geostrategic position that renders it vulnerable to the downstream consequences of any regional conflict.
Afghanistan may not be a central player in U.S.-Iran hostilities. Its history of tense and at times hostile relations with both parties, however, together with its proximity to Iran and resultant vulnerability to the latter’s regional influence all point to heightened risk. How Afghanistan may be affected by such developments, therefore, requires an evaluation in the context of the Taliban’s limited yet consequential agency in a standoff showing little sign of relenting.
Strategic Ambiguity: Between Tehran and Washington
Since the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021, Afghanistan has receded from the foreground of global diplomacy. Yet situation between China, post-Soviet and occasionally US-aligned Central Asia, and Iran does make it geopolitically critical. Despite their antagonistic history with the United States, the Taliban have maintained a channel of unofficial coordination, primarily on security and humanitarian issues, whilst also developing increasingly pragmatic relations with Iran. The paradox was that both Iran and the U.S, in recent history, were once united in their opposition to the Taliban and enthusiasm for their 2001 overthrow.
Iran would go on to leverage the US occupation of Afghanistan to its strategic benefit further. Tehran augmented its influence along the ethno-political spectrum in Afghanistan, relying both on linguistic commonalities with Dari-speaking communities as well as religious solidarity with the minority of Shia in Afghanistan. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF), most notably, cultivated serious influence amongst the Hazara community. This went as far as recruiting Afghan Shia legions to fight its proxy wars in Iraq and Syria.
Much changed with the end of the US occupation of Afghanistan. Iran’s influence was largely clipped by the Taliban’s monopolisation of power and, in other theatres, Tehran sustained a further succession of blows through relentless Israeli attacks on its proxy networks and finally, Syria’s liberation from the Assad regime. Tehran may be battered, but it remains, at least for now, standing, and thereby capable of exerting influence beyond its borders. That includes Afghanistan.
The same is true for Washington; it may have been subjected to a humiliating withdrawal from Afghanistan after two failed decades of occupation, but the U.S. retains advanced surveillance infrastructure across Central Asia and a close relationship with Pakistan’s increasingly beleaguered military. An outbreak of hostilities between Iran and the U.S. could force the Taliban to adopt a stance, potentially compromising internal cohesion or exposing Afghanistan to external retaliation.
Iran’s Shia Assets: The Fatemiyoun Contingency
Among Iran’s key strategic levers is the Fatemiyoun Brigade, a militia composed of Afghan Shia fighters originally deployed in Syria. Controlled by the IRGC, the group comprises thousands of battle-hardened veterans, many residing in western Afghanistan and Iranian cities such as Mashhad and Tehran.
In the event of any wider escalation, Iran could reactivate Fatemiyoun units including by deploying them to whichever feasible regional theatre, given the units’ utility in providing cheap and politically inconsequential manpower. Even in the absence of such an escalation, Iran retains enough influence in which a reconfiguration of the Fatemiyoun into a Hazara-centric political or armed movement cannot be ruled out, particularly if Taliban policies alienate Shia communities.
To date, the Taliban have exercised a cautious approach towards the Shia, prioritising domestic stability by adopting a posture best described as conciliatory yet firmly Sunni and specifically Hanafi. However, Iranian activation of Shia networks could provoke sectarian backlash, heighten tensions with Sunnis, and create opportunities for actors such as the ‘Islamic State Khorasan Province’ (ISKP).
ISKP: An Opportunistic Threat
ISKP remains a volatile factor in the Afghan security landscape. Designating both the Taliban and Iran as adversaries, the former ironically derided as a puppet of the latter, it has escalated attacks on Shia populations in addition to Sunnis it deems heterodox whilst routinely propaganda portraying the Taliban as compromised by Iranian influence. A broader Iran-U.S. conflict would likely incentivise ISKP to Intensify attacks on Shia communities and Iranian interests, sabotage diplomatic or logistical corridors connecting Iran and western Afghanistan whilst exploiting instability for recruitment and smuggling.
Perceptions of Taliban acquiescence to Iranian interests, which ISKP would no doubt keenly highlight, could further undermine social cohesion within Afghanistan.
Economic Pressures and Vulnerable Borders
The Afghan provinces of Herat, Nimruz, Farah, and Badghis are particularly exposed to regional spillover. These western regions are heavily reliant on cross-border trade with Iran, including fuel, foodstuffs, and construction materials. Key crossings—Islam Qala in Herat and Milak in Nimruz—form lifelines for the local economy.
A regional escalation could:
- Disrupt trade, triggering inflation and shortages;
- Prompt Iran to restrict crossings or repatriate Afghan migrants;
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Incubate the revival and growth of illicit trade networks, including of drugs, increasing the influence of organised criminal groups.
Diplomatic Aspirations and Neutrality Constraints
Despite these risks, the Taliban may view this geopolitical moment as an opportunity to enhance their regional legitimacy. By positioning Afghanistan as a neutral conduit for dialogue between Iran and the United States, the Taliban could attempt to gain diplomatic relevance.
To do so, however, they must curtail ISKP whilst managing intra-Emirate dissent, particularly amongst its anti-Iran elements. Any mediating role would finally require Kabul to demonstrate a consistency and capability in international engagement that it thus far has been sorely lacking in.
Though Afghanistan’s interim government lacks formal recognition, regional actors such as China and Russia may encourage mediation efforts to prevent a wider destabilisation of West and Central Asia.
Margins of Conflict, Centre of Risk
Afghanistan, though peripheral to the immediate U.S.-Iran standoff, occupies a central position in the matrix of consequences. Whether as a conduit for diplomacy or a zone of escalation, it cannot remain unaffected.
The Taliban face a critical test in managing external pressures and possibly assuming a stabilising role. The currents of regional conflict, otherwise, could again draw Afghanistan into turmoil. The periphery, in this case, may become the pivot.